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Abstract   Colleges and universities already contribute significantly to the fight against 
climate change, but the UN has recently called upon them to do even more. The purpose 
of this article is to demonstrate that institutions of higher education play a unique role in 
combatting climate change and other structural injustices, not only by conducting 
research and disseminating knowledge, but also by fostering a form of collective political 
responsibility. A philosophical analysis of different forms of collective responsibility, 
with specific attention to the Fossil Free divestment movement, reveals how social 
position facilitates this contribution more so in colleges than in other institutions. 
Keywords   Climate change, collective responsibility, fossil fuel divestment, student 
activism 
I. Introduction
Colleges and universities1 already contribute significantly to the fight against climate 
change. Researchers from a wide range of disciplines identify causes, effects, and 
possible solutions to the challenges posed by a warming planet. Scholars share the 
knowledge gained through such work with each other, their students, and the public. Yet 
the United Nations (UN) has called upon colleges to do even more.  
The 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris reached a monumental global 
commitment of 195 nations to tackle climate change. Article 12 of this Paris agreement 
explicitly states: 
Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change 
education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to 
information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing 
actions under this Agreement (UNFCC 2015). 
1 Throughout this article, these two words will be used interchangeably. 
2 Perhaps Basken’s focus on the hard sciences is too limited. Other fields, such as philosophy, may 
2 
This charge is not new. The UN created the Higher Education Sustainability Initiative 
(HESI) in anticipation of COP 20. HESI also called for improvements in teaching, 
research, engagement, local efforts at universities, and information sharing (Sustainable 
Development.org). And in fact, an appeal to educational institutions can be found as far 
back as “Our Common Future,” the report that led to the establishment of the first Earth 
Summit in Rio 1992 (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). 
Universities are the world’s best centers for research and knowledge production. Why do 
so many external to academia deem it necessary to encourage them to contribute more to 
fighting one of the gravest challenges? Shouldn’t internal motivation drive such research? 
Perhaps structural limitations within academia itself discourage this work. Scholars 
lack incentive to conduct serious research on the deeper social roots of climate change – 
for instance, research on the political implication of climate science or corporate 
influence on public opinion – since this type of work is more difficult to publish than 
research represented with quantitative modeling (Basken 2016).2 The call for greater 
action may aim to deconstruct these limitations, and to open up new venues and 
incentives for such research. However, the possibilities for how colleges can engage with 
these issues is not exhausted by research, publishing, information sharing, teaching, and 
community outreach. Colleges offer fertile grounds for activist movements. 
Recently over 800 independently operated chapters of the Fossil Free divestment 
movement have sprung up across the world, many on college campuses (FossilFree.org). 
Students, faculty, staff, and community members have launched campaigns to rid 
endowments of fossil fuel holdings. Some demonstrations, involving sit-ins, protests, 
arrests, and more have received a great deal of attention in the press. At COP 21 the 
Fossil Free campaign announced over $3.4 trillion had been divested (350.org), and this 
number has continued to grow. 
Institutes of higher learning have long been a center for many movements; for 
instance, civil rights, anti-capitalism, anti-war, apartheid, and anti-sweatshop. Recently, 
they have turned their attention to issues such as police violence and fossil fuel holdings. 
These issues all have something in common: the individual college or institution cannot 
improve much by acting on its own. In other words, these issues invoke collective 
responsibility – a philosophically contentious subject – because they arise from collective 
action. Such problems require a collective rather than a private response since they do not 
arise from individual behavior, but from the social structures that influence such 
behavior. The response to collective action problems must be collective since no one 
agent has the power to transform structures in isolation. But why are college campuses so 
often at the epicenter of movements involving structural injustice? 
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that institutions of higher education play 
a unique role in combatting climate and other structural injustices, not only by conducting 
research and disseminating knowledge, but also by fostering a form of collective political 
responsibility. A philosophical analysis of different forms of collective responsibility, 
with specific attention to the Fossil Free divestment movement, reveals how social 																																																								
2 Perhaps Basken’s focus on the hard sciences is too limited. Other fields, such as philosophy, may 
encounter fewer limitations to pursuing such research. For one instance, see Kovel 2007. However, it is 
true that IPCC’s more recent 5th Assessment report is the first to address the moral implications of climate 
change and to include two philosophers among its authors. So one problem may be that the IPCC does not 
pay enough attention to work that falls under the social sciences and the humanities. 
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position facilitates this contribution more so in colleges than in other institutions. Section 
II examines three mutually reinforcing methods for understanding collective 
responsibility. Section III assesses these methods alongside climate change, a collective 
action problem that requires a political form of responsibility. Section IV argues that the 
fossil fuel divestment movement illustrates how colleges can leverage their unique social 
position to meet this responsibility. Section V concludes that college communities can do 
more to combat climate change by helping to foster this kind of activity on their 
campuses. 
 
II. Three Approaches to Collective Responsibility 
Most recognize that climate change demands a form of collective responsibility, but such 
a demand presents many philosophical difficulties. 3  First, collective responsibility 
challenges principles of justice. That climate change is harmful is no longer so 
controversial as who is responsible for its harms. While most agree obligations should fall 
upon state agents, identifying these state agents among others has been a contentious 
issue (Brown 1998; Caney 2010; Gardiner 2011; Maniates 2001; Shue 1993; Traxler 
2002). Candidates include, for example, those with the most historical emissions (Brown 
1998; Caney 2010; Schüssler 2011), those who can reduce emissions in the most cost-
effective manner (Posner and Weisbach 2010), or those who exceed equal per capita 
emission allowances (Singer 2002). Second, according to many climate experts, states are 
not acting quickly enough.4 Therefore, many question whether responsibilities fall upon 
other agents, such as local governments, corporations, other institutions, or even 
individual citizens. Such responsibilities may be direct, meaning agents should take 
actions to reduce their own emissions; or they may be indirect, meaning agents should 
pressure governments, which have more power to effect meaningful reductions through 
regulations and transnational agreements. 
The scope of this paper includes neither principles of justly distributed cleanup 
burdens, nor the question of direct or indirect duties, but a more primary set of concerns: 
what is the nature of shared collective responsibility? There are at least two reasons to 
examine this question. First, the form of responsibility limits the shape its content might 
take; for instance, whether duties can even be direct or indirect, since form determines 
what kinds of collective agents are involved (i.e., whether responsibility is shared among 
collective agents). Since state agents are not acting quickly enough, this question 
becomes particularly important. Second, understanding the nature of collective 
responsibility will help identify the qualities colleges possess as collective agents that 
enable such responsibility, qualities that other institutions lack. Identifying this nature 
will help reveal how colleges are in a unique position to address climate change. 
																																																								
3 A number of problems arise with the concept of collective responsibility itself; however, they will not 
be discussed here. This paper assumes some form of collective responsibility is necessary to combat 
climate change; the present task is to determine the nature of this responsibility. 
4 James Hansen, former NASA scientist turned activist, has even called COP 21 in Paris a “hoax” 
(Milman 2015). 
4 
Philosophers have adopted at least three different general methods for describing the 
structure of collective responsibility and how it arises. Each of these methods is outlined 
below. The next section will assess each method in light of climate change.5 
 
Group agency and individual agency 
The first approach examines the possibility and constitution of group agency. Presuming 
only agents can be morally responsible, collective responsibility must belong to collective 
agents. Many philosophers have outlined the criteria for collective agency. For the most 
part, these criteria mirror those for individual agency. Individual agents constitute a group 
agent when they share some combination of intentions, desires, and deliberative decision-
making procedures (Gilbert 1992; List and Pettit 2011; Tuomela 2013). Collectives 
organized enough to possess collective responsibility are often referred to as “groups” to 
distinguish them from a “mere collective” of agents. 
The concept of group agency is useful for several reasons. First, certain kinds of 
actions can only be taken by groups; for instance, a crowd at a sporting event performing 
the wave, or a team winning a football game. The wave cannot be performed alone just as 
a single player cannot win a game on her own (Isaacs 2011, p. 34). Second, group agency 
helps describe how people speak and feel about collectives such as political parties or 
companies as extra-individual entities (Held 1970, p. 471–472). People say they 
disapprove of a political party’s stance on an important social issue, or they are angry 
with BP for failing to implement an effective plan to stop a leaking oil rig. Finally, group 
agency helps avoid a “deficit of responsibility,” which may arise when no individual 
agent is responsible (List & Pettit 2011, p. 165). Companies can be penalized legally or 
morally (e.g., incur fines or blame) even when no single person can be found guilty of 
breaking a law. 
 
Practical reasons for holding responsible 
The second approach questions the practical reasons for holding collectives responsible 
even when they fail to exhibit features of agency. This approach captures the idea that 
individual agents are able to, often do, and most importantly should band together to 
solve collective action problems. For instance, onlookers should work together to save a 
drowning swimmer in turbulent waters, perhaps by forming a human chain. A mere 
collective, even of random agents, has a responsibility to organize action when the result 
is favorable to doing nothing (e.g., letting the swimmer drown), and when the required 
action is “obvious to the reasonable person” (Held 1970, p. 476). 
The same responsibility applies to established organizations that lack the prerequisites 
for group agency discussed above – for instance, decision-making procedures. As with 
small children, holding collectives responsible when they do not display the full signs of 
moral agency can be instructive and can even encourage them to develop such capacities 
(List and Pettit 2011, pp. 157 & 193). Moral disapproval can encourage a company to 
develop proper offices and procedures for dealing with harms they may cause. Thus not 
just agency, but the potential for agency gives rise to responsibility. 
 
Social connection and structural injustice 																																																								
5  These three approaches are discussed in greater detail, alongside the difficulties of sharing 
responsibility for collective action problems, in Godoy (forthcoming). 
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The third approach grounds collective responsibility in neither collective agency nor its 
possibility alone, but in social position, or connection within a network of agency and 
collective projects that presume the interaction of many different agents (Young 2011). 
This form of responsibility is ideal for addressing what Young calls “structural injustice”: 
Structural injustice…exists when social processes put large groups of persons under 
systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise 
their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to dominate or to 
have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities available 
to them. (p. 52) 
The uncoordinated routine activities of many agents reproduce structural injustices; they 
are “a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting to pursue their particular 
goals and interests, for the most part within the limits of accepted rules and norms” 
(Young 2011, p. 52). 
Climate change is a form of structural injustice. First, it results from routine, 
seemingly harmless activities in the domestic and economic spheres: e.g., travel, 
production, and investment. Second, climate change certainly puts large groups of people 
“under systematic threat of domination or deprivation” while also benefiting others. 
Those who have contributed least to climate change – the world’s poor and those yet to 
be born – stand to suffer its worst consequences. The world’s affluent also stands to 
benefit most from the conveniences of fossil fuel use – industrial production, and cheap 
transportation and energy. The world’s poor are most vulnerable, facing droughts, 
famine, water shortages, rising sea levels, floods, and storms all with fewer resources to 
mitigate their effects. Finally, the world’s affluent have become so in part because of 
their unrestricted ability to pollute the atmosphere with greenhouse gases, a byproduct of 
economic activity and growth.6 
Structural harm differs qualitatively from harm that arises from individual actors 
(Young 2011, p. 44); even individual group agents. For instance, investigative journalists 
revealed that Exxon knew about the link between fossil fuels and climate change since at 
least 1977 (Banerjee, Song, and Hasemyer 2015). In this case, each individual member of 
Exxon may be guilty if she actively misled the public about how fossil fuels cause 
climate change. However, sometimes focus on individual offending agents alone is 
unhelpful. If one fails to question the structural factors that encourage “bad” behavior, 
then “bad” individual actions appear as anomalies rather than predictable byproducts. 
Indeed, a number of other energy companies shared information about the connection 
between fossil fuels and climate change (Banerjee 2015). Rather, preventing structural 
harm requires examining the various social structures that encourage or enable individual 
agents to cause it. How did so many multinational corporations actively mislead the 
public about their destructive practices in the pursuit of greater profits? Fossil fuel 
companies have a strong incentive to deny a link between their product and harm. The 
same was true of tobacco companies when smoking was linked to cancer. In fact, fossil 
fuel and tobacco companies confused the public about these links by using similar 
methods (Oreskes and Conway 2010). 
																																																								
6 Economic growth is almost always paired with increasing carbon dioxide levels. The exceptions are 
2014 and 2015. The only other periods of declining carbon dioxide are associated with a slowing economy 
(International Energy Agency 2016). 
6 
Social connection responsibility is different from other forms of collective and 
individual responsibility in the following senses. First, responsibility for structural 
injustice corresponds to “social position,” or place of privilege or disadvantage the agent 
occupies relative to other agents, institutions, and social processes (Young 2011, p. 56). 
Second, this responsibility is neither collective nor individual, but shared;7 social position 
determines how it is shared. Finally, this responsibility aims to transform unjust 
structures, not hold individuals accountable for “bad” action, so it is met through 
collective action (Young 2011, p. 111). Agents are morally responsible because they 
participate in processes that lead to unjust outcomes. However, this responsibility is more 
than complicity in harm (Kutz 2007), since one does not meet it by withdrawing 
participation. Rather, meeting social connection responsibility requires examining one’s 
social position and acting with others to transform unjust structures. In other words, this 
is a forward-looking, political form of responsibility as opposed to a retrospective, 
individualized form (Young 2011, pp. 105–112). 
 
III. Assessing Methods 
This section examines each of the above three models alongside climate change as a form 
of structural injustice. Each model offers some insight into why universities have 
responsibilities to address climate change; however, the social connection model explains 
the role that the social position of colleges plays in giving a unique shape to these 
responsibilities relative to other institutions. 
 
Isolated agents? 
Most universities qualify as group agents. As such, they are appropriate subjects of 
collective responsibility according to the group agent approach. Failure to address 
responsibilities may warrant condemnation, blame, shame, or other responses from the 
public. However, this approach tends to individualize responsibility. 
For instance, philosophers disagree over whether or how collective responsibility 
distributes among group members (Cooper 1968; Feinberg 1968; List and Pettit 2011; 
May 1998; Young 2011), though most agree “judgments assessed on members of the 
collectivity do not follow necessarily from judgments of collective blame” (French 1998, 
p. 25). In other words, an employee of ExxonMobil cannot apologize on behalf of the 
company for lying about its decades-long awareness of the connection between fossil 
fuels and global warming unless she is authorized to do so (List and Pettit 2001, p. 35–
36). Likewise a citizen cannot apologize on behalf of his state for failing to ratify an 
international climate treaty. Group agency itself says nothing of how responsibility 
disseminates among agents: among group members, between group agents, and between 
members and non-members. Group agency concentrates responsibility within atomized 
agents (groups or individuals); by doing so, it isolates agency and fails to explain how 
sharing responsibility for climate change is possible. 
Yet since climate change is a form of structural injustice, individuals, group agents, 
and states all need to cooperate to avert further harmful climate change. One college 
divesting of fossil fuels may make headlines, but will not affect much on its own. 
Furthermore, if only the actions or inactions of individual agents are considered, then the 																																																								
7 For further discussion of the distinction between collective and shared responsibility, see May 1992 
(pp. 106–107) and Young 2011 (pp. 110–111).  
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significance of such actions is lost in the vast sea of many other acting agents. Perhaps 
such actions have communicative power – may encourage others to act (Hourdequin 
2011) – but not necessarily. Responsibility for structural injustice must be shared among 
agents. 
 
Obvious and reasonable? 
The second approach addresses some of the issues discussed above. First, it accords with 
moral intuitions about the obligation to solve problems by working together, constructing 
new group agents, even spur of the moment, when doing so produces morally preferable 
outcomes. This approach also encourages agents to further develop capacities to address 
new moral situations. The first step many schools take when considering divestment is to 
assemble a working group or committee to assess investments. While committees on 
socially responsible investment and sustainability have been common features of 
contemporary universities, new issues such as climate change and divestment strengthen 
interest in them. 
However this approach becomes difficult when we consider problems on a global 
scale. The “obvious and reasonable” criteria may be clear in the case of a drowning 
swimmer, but as problems become more complex so do solutions. Agents should act with 
others to form new groups, but with whom they should be acting is unclear. Social 
connection adds to the practical reasons approach by giving agents parameters of 
reasoning about their action corresponding to social position. 
 
Connected how? 
The social connection approach holds that agents share a responsibility relative to their 
social position within the structures that lead to a warming climate. Like the practical 
reasons approach, this responsibility may entail developing new groups and structures. It 
may also ask group agents to draw from their position. But both the subject and content 
of responsibility – who must do what? – is still quite vague. To combat this, Young 
(2011) suggests four parameters by which to locate and distribute responsibility based on 
an agent's position within the network: privilege, collective ability, interest, and power 
(pp. 142–151). The next section examines how these parameters describe the social 
positions of universities, and how the fossil fuel divestment movement illustrates a form 
of this political responsibility by leveraging social position to influence change. 
 
IV. Social Connection Responsibility on College Campuses 
Because universities occupy similar social positions relative to one another, and because 
they are able to draw upon similar resources afforded by their social position, universities 
are candidates for sharing responsibility. Below each parameter is examined with 
reference to the divestment movement. 
 
Privilege 
Endowment-holding institutions reap profits from harmful investments, yet as institutions 
they avoid the terrible consequences, such as suffering and death, which befall actual 
people. This places them in a relative position of privilege. By forgoing this privilege, 
colleges prove such holdings unnecessary for financial health. Structural injustice arises 
from the routine (in this case, stockholding). Many think it immoral to benefit from the 
8 
harms of others. Divesting colleges uphold this principle when they surrender their 
privilege to draw benefits from fossil fuel investments. Social connection responsibility 
requires forfeiting this privilege in order to challenge the presumption that any agent 
should benefit from harmful practices. Sharing responsibility entails encouraging others 
to divest as well. Colleges send a public message to other colleges and stockholders when 
they join the Fossil Free movement: that they believe divestment is both possible and 
good. 
 
Collective ability 
The divestment movement targets all endowed institutions, which explains why many 
non-profit and government institutions are also involved. However, colleges are unique in 
their collective ability. Their decision-making mechanisms, more so than other 
institutions, often encourage the entire community to participate democratically in issues 
of governance. Student and faculty governing bodies are often represented at various 
levels of the institution, even at the board level. These bodies hold decision-makers 
accountable. They create new directives and committees, such as socially responsible 
investment committees. It has not been uncommon for board members, students, faculty, 
and staff to work together on divesting campuses. Compare this structure with that found 
in the corporate or political world. Employees often cannot criticize their superiors 
without fear of reprisal or loss of employment. Colleges also care a great deal about 
community development, ensuring that all students have both a place and a voice in the 
affairs of the community.8 
 
Interest 
“Sometimes agents’ interests coincide with the responsibility for justice” (Young 2011, p. 
145). Colleges declare their purpose or interest through mission statements. These 
statements often make reference to increasing public welfare, benefiting society on a 
national and a global scale, improving the world for future generations, etc.; and more 
recently, colleges have pledged an interest in sustainability. Many Fossil Free chapters 
have leveraged their university’s mission statements in their arguments to divest. It is 
difficult to commit to future welfare while engaging in practices that work against it. 
Finally, colleges have an interest in the truth. The links between burning fossil fuels and 
climate change, and between profitability and shareholder support, are undeniable. 
 
Power 
Both individual agents within colleges and colleges as collective agents themselves 
possess unique powers to affect unjust structures merely by provoking debates about 
them. An organized student group has a great deal of power to influence its university’s 
decision-making processes. First, unlike employees at other institutions, students cannot 
be fired. Second, students are stakeholders in the reputations of the college; their diploma 
will bear its mark for their lifetime. Third, it reflects poorly on schools to expel students 
																																																								
8 This is at least true in principle. The recent Black Lives Matter movement raises questions about the 
place and voice of non-white students at American universities. Yet the movement strategically leverages 
this supposed principle of inclusion in order to help make its point. 
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engaged in peaceful political demonstration. Tenured faculty may have similar power, 
especially en masse.9 
While students and faculty possess power within universities, universities themselves 
hold external power to influence public discourse. Their reputation as centers of 
knowledge and learning carries intellectual weight both within academia and in public 
culture at large. Each additional divesting university amplifies the influence of the 
movement. All endowment-holding universities have the power to divest. By exerting it, 
they hope to influence the political and economic structures that enable climate change. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper began with the claim that universities should be doing more to meet their 
collective responsibility to combat climate. Three different methods for describing 
collective responsibility were examined. The social connection model builds upon the 
group agent and practical reasons methods to highlight how responsibility arises, not in a 
vacuum, but in a complex network of social relations. Since climate change is a structural 
injustice, it too arises within a network of routine interactions. Meeting social connection 
responsibility entails leveraging one’s position and working with other agents to 
transform the structures that encourage climate change. It follows that colleges could 
foster social connection responsibility in the form of campus discussion, activism, and 
movement building.  
Note this paper makes no claim that divestment is best method for addressing climate 
change. This would require further studies. Rather, since climate change requires 
collective political action, colleges can help develop the form of responsibility required to 
spur positive social change by fostering these types of discussions and engaging with 
climate movements such as Fossil Free. 
Campuses have historically housed a number of movements exercising political 
responsibility. Take for instance the South African divestment movement. The movement 
against apartheid was not born of strategy, but dissatisfaction with the governing 
structures that failed to adequately address injustice (Seidman 2015, p. 1017). Divestment 
began as an act of moral hand-washing, a communicative act of disapproval. College 
campuses played a significant role by provoking debates about the moral status of 
maintaining economic ties to apartheid (Seidman 2015, p. 1023). The seat of the 
movement's power was not the actual financial effect of divesting colleges, but the power 
to question – to politicize and moralize – the economic structures that allowed institutions 
to profit from apartheid. In other words, students and universities drew from their 
position to leverage social change, change which was only possible by sharing 
responsibility with other universities and institutions. 
Laboratories and classrooms are therefore not the university’s only resources for 
confronting climate change. Challenging structural injustice requires questioning the 
routines that sustain harmful practices. This can be controversial. Colleges can encourage 
members to engage in the necessary contentious debates, critical self-scrutiny, and 
experimental reimagining of harmful commonplace habits – and they can pledge to 
protect those members who do so. They can allow student and faculty representation in 
decision-making processes and provide information about their investments and practices 																																																								
9 However, academic freedom is a value that is not equally admired everywhere. 
10 
necessary for informed decisions. The university community itself can become a lab and 
classroom, and colleges can lead the way instigating the cultural-political transformations 
necessary for confronting climate change. 
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